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Contracts and the 
Institutional Environment 
for Electricity Reform
 
Recent law and economics literature suggests that 
courts and administrative agencies should allow 
utilities to renegotiate supply contracts signed prior to 
restructuring, as an attractive alternative to continued 
regulatory oversight or possible bankruptcy.
 
Albert L. Danielsen, Nainish K. Gupta, and Peter G. Klein
 
s electricity markets are restruc-
tured, buyers and sellers are 
increasingly relying on contracts to 
exchange energy and associated 
services. Unfortunately, many con-
tracts currently in place were nego-
tiated under more invasive regula-
tory regimes and are no longer 
economically viable. For instance, 
under the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), many 
utilities were required to buy 
power from qualifying facilities 
(QFs) at what regulators deter-
mined were their “avoided costs,” 
the costs the regulators deemed the 
utilities would have incurred by 
producing the power themselves. 
Many such contracts were feasible 
only because regulation allowed 
utilities to recover costs from rate-
payers under regulated tariffs. 
Furthermore, some utilities negoti-
ated contracts with non-utility 
generators (NUGs) to honor obli-
gations to serve native-load cus-
tomers and signed take-or-pay 
agreements with price guarantees, 
believing that all costs would be 
recovered through tariffs paid by 
their ratepayers.
With the introduction of compe-
tition into electricity markets, cap-
tive ratepayers are being trans-
formed into consumers with 
choices. Without their ability to 
pass costs on to ratepayers, utilities 
are finding it difficult to honor 
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NUG contract obligations. Within 
the last five years, utilities such as 
Niagara Mohawk (NIMO) and 
Pennsylvania Power & Light 
(PP&L) have tried to renegotiate 
NUG contracts, leading to arbitra-
tion and litigation. Renegotiating 
NUG contracts remains an 
intensely political issue as state 
regulatory commissions and the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) continue to be 
involved in the process. In several 
cases, these agencies have ruled 
that the original agreements 
remain in place.
hould the renegotiation of 
NUG contracts be permitted? 
The central issue is whether con-
tracting parties have a legal duty 
to fulfill their obligations under all 
circumstances without modifica-
tion, or whether under certain con-
ditions, such as rapidly changing 
regulatory environments, contract 
renegotiations or even unilateral 
breach is preferable. In this article 
we draw on recent law and eco-
nomics literature to argue that 
breach can, in some situations, be 
an efficient response to unfore-
seen changes in the legal, compet-
itive, and regulatory environ-
ments. For this reason, the success 
of market-based reforms depends 
on how existing contracts are 
enforced and/or modified. Effec-
tive restructuring of the electric 
industry may require rethinking 
the legal arrangements designed 
under regulation.
 
1
 
The way courts and administra-
tive agencies treat contracts forms 
an important part of what Davis 
and North (1971) call the “institu-
tional environment” in which con-
tracts are designed.
 
2
 
 Studies of 
electric restructuring often over-
look the role of the courts, but by 
establishing the “rules of the 
game” these institutions shape the 
feasibility and specific direction of 
reform. For instance, Glachant and 
Finon show that the structural dif-
ferences among European electric-
ity markets are explained largely 
by differences in legislative, judi-
cial, and administrative proce-
to review the modern economics 
literature on contracts and insti-
tutions, which is an important 
part of the “new institutional eco-
nomics.”
 
5
 
 Our treatment of insti-
tutions focuses on the branch of 
the new institutional economics 
that studies the “institutional 
environment.” By Davis and 
North’s definition, the institu-
tional environment refers to the 
background constraints, or rules 
of the game, that guide the behav-
ior of individuals and firms. 
These can be both formal, explicit 
rules (constitutions, laws, prop-
erty rights) and informal, often 
implicit rules (social conven-
tions, norms). While the rules are 
the product of—and can be 
explained in terms of—the goals, 
beliefs, and choices of individual 
actors, the social result (the rule 
itself) is typically not known or 
“designed” by anyone.
 
6
 
avis and North distinguish 
the institutional environ-
ment from what they term “insti-
tutional arrangements.” Institu-
tional arrangements are specific 
guidelines—what Williamson calls 
“governance structures”
 
7
 
—
designed by trading partners to 
mediate particular economic rela-
tionships. Business firms, long-
term contracts, public bureaucra-
cies, nonprofit organizations, and 
other contractual agreements are 
examples of institutional arrange-
ments. NUG contracts are thus 
particular institutional arrange-
ments, while the contract law 
regime itself is part of the institu-
tional environment.
The institutional environment 
forms the background against 
 
The central issue is
whether contracting
parties have a legal
duty to fulfill their
obligations under
all circumstances
 
without modification.
 
dures in each country.
 
3
 
 They argue 
that the English-style disintegrated 
model has not been widely 
adopted on the Continent because 
those countries lack the stable, par-
liamentary, and largely unitary 
government that characterizes the 
United Kingdom.
 
4
 
 Similarly, elec-
tricity reform in the United States 
will be based on the legal status of 
contracts negotiated under previ-
ous regulatory regimes.
 
I. Contracts and the 
Institutional Environment
 
Before examining the particu-
lars of NUG contracts, it is useful 
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which institutional arrangements 
are designed. The content of par-
ticular contracts is circumscribed 
by the rules laid out in contract 
law, commercial codes, and other 
background rules. The new insti-
tutional economics has been par-
ticularly interested in contract law 
and property law.
 
8
 
 However, 
unlike the “legal centralism” tra-
dition, which holds that disputes 
are primarily settled by the courts 
as official agents of the state, the 
new institutional economics 
focuses on private solutions, hold-
ing that “in many instances the 
participants can devise more sat-
isfactory solutions to their dis-
putes than can professionals con-
strained to apply general rules on 
the basis of limited knowledge of 
the dispute.”
 
9
 
Informal, and often tacit, rules 
are important not only for govern-
ing commercial relationships; they 
also structure other forms of social 
conduct. “[F]ormal rules . . . make 
up a small . . . part of the sum of 
constraints that shape choices; . . . 
the governing structure is over-
whelmingly defined by codes of 
conduct, norms of behavior, and 
conventions.”
 
10
 
 Such rules, once 
established, form constraints for 
individual actors. Yet how can the 
rules themselves be explained in 
terms of purposeful individual 
choices? In Menger’s words: “How 
can it be that institutions which 
serve the common welfare and are 
extremely significant for its devel-
opment come into being without a 
common will directed toward 
establishing them?”
 
11
 
Game theorists interpret informal 
institutions as Nash-equilibrium 
solutions to repeated games 
faced by individuals in social 
settings.
 
12
 
 These equilibria are 
described as “norms,” “conven-
tions,” or “social institutions.” As 
defined by Schotter, a social insti-
tution is “a regularity in social 
behavior that is agreed to by all 
members of society, specifies 
behavior in specific recurrent sit-
uations, and is either self-policed 
or policed by some external 
the law.”
 
15
 
 Moreover, norms can 
help form the law, if judges look to 
social norms as guidelines for legal 
decisions.
 
16
 
 Today, many commer-
cial disputes are resolved privately, 
through organizations such as the 
VISA Arbitration Committee.
 
17
 
 
Still, private resolutions typically 
depend on the expected decisions 
of courts and regulatory bodies 
should parties fail to resolve their 
differences.
or these reasons, court rulings 
and FERC decisions on NUG 
contract renegotiations, and 
stranded-cost issues more gener-
ally, are extremely important. 
These rulings and decisions not 
only effect the specific parties to 
the dispute, they also help estab-
lish the legal framework within 
which future contractual negotia-
tions will take place.
 
II. Breach of Contract
 
How should the legal system 
treat contractual breaches? Breach-
ing a contract is breaking a prom-
ise, and for that reason alone many 
observers conclude that breach is 
necessarily immoral as well as ille-
gal. However, contracts are 
breached routinely and are often 
renegotiated without litigation. 
Breach usually occurs when the 
cost of performing one’s contrac-
tual obligations exceeds his 
expected liability for breach. If par-
ties are liable only for actual dam-
ages imposed on their contractual 
partners, then breach will gener-
ally be efficient: I breach when the 
cost of performing to me exceeds 
the value of my performance to 
you. Such a breach is a (potential) 
 
Informal, and often tacit, 
rules are important not 
only for governing 
commercial relation-
ships; they also 
structure other forms 
 
of social conduct.
 
authority.”
 
13
 
 Ellickson explains 
that social norms can be superior 
to administrative or judicial dis-
pute resolution among people 
with close social ties.
 
14
 
However, such norms often 
develop within the formal legal 
framework. For example, law 
shapes the outcome of private bar-
gaining by serving as a backup 
mechanism for resolving disputes 
that cannot be resolved privately. If 
the alternative to private dispute 
resolution is resolution in court, 
then the expected outcome at trial 
determines the parties’ behavior 
during bargaining. Bargaining typ-
ically takes place “in the shadow of 
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Pareto improvement, saving 
resources that would otherwise be 
wasted fulfilling an economically 
nonviable agreement.
 
18
 
fficient breaches are usually 
resolved without formal liti-
gation because they create poten-
tial gains that can be distributed 
among the contracting parties. Vol-
untary contractual renegotiations 
thus represent 
 
optimal breaches
 
: no 
party is harmed by the change and 
at least one party is made better 
off. Litigating such disputes is usu-
ally more costly than private dis-
pute resolution. Breaches that do 
not involve potential gains are 
more difficult to resolve privately 
because at least one party suffers 
net harm. For these reasons, effi-
cient breaches are typically rene-
gotiated privately, whereas ineffi-
cient breaches are more often 
resolved in court. This is the gen-
eral pattern of dispute resolution 
in electricity markets.
A central question is whether 
and to what extent the legal reme-
dies for breach are designed to 
promote optimal breach while 
discouraging non-optimal breach. 
When can releasing one party 
from an obligation benefit all par-
ties? Courts typically employ one 
of three breach remedies: 
 
expecta-
tion damages
 
 (a payment that 
makes the victim of breach as well 
off as with performance), 
 
reliance 
damages
 
 (a payment that makes 
the victim as well off as if the con-
tract had not been signed in the 
first place), and 
 
specific performance
 
 
(court-ordered performance). The 
law and economics literature gen-
erally argues for an expectations 
damages rule to promote efficient 
investment and breach. A reliance 
damages rule creates a moral-
hazard problem that can lead to 
overinvestment by the potential 
victim of breach. Specific perfor-
mance is usually imposed only in 
cases where there is no close sub-
stitute for the promised good (for 
example, a rare painting). Under 
expectation damages, however, 
the party that breaches bears the 
entire costs of breach, since the 
victim must be compensated for 
stitutes breaking a promise, the 
law and economics literature 
makes almost the opposite point. 
Since contracts are incomplete, 
breach may be exactly what the 
parties would have wanted, and 
would have specified, if the con-
tract had been complete.
 
19
 
 Breach 
rules should thus be chosen 
according to the incentives they 
provide as well as the penalties 
they assess. Because damage 
awards establish the cost of cer-
tain behaviors, they should be 
regarded as prices as well 
as punishments.
 
III. The Origin of
NUG Contracts
 
Most NUG contracts were nego-
tiated after PURPA was passed in 
1978. This law was enacted after 
four decades of market-demand 
prorationing of crude oil, after two 
decades of wellhead price regula-
tion of natural gas, and five years 
after the Arab oil embargo in 1973–
74. PURPA was designed prima-
rily to conserve energy, reduce 
dependence on imported crude oil 
and refined petroleum products, 
and promote the use of renewable 
energy resources. One way these 
goals were to be achieved under 
PURPA was by encouraging and 
facilitating the development of 
cogeneration plants and small-
scale, non-utility-owned qualify-
ing facilities. Utilities were 
required to connect with these 
facilities and buy power at prices 
based on the avoided cost of the 
utilities’ own additional power 
resources. When PURPA was con-
ceived and implemented, most 
 
Efficient breaches are
usually resolved
without formal
litigation because they
create potential gains
 
that can be distributed.
 
investments made in anticipation 
of fulfillment. Breach will thus 
occur only if the net value of 
breach exceeds the net value of 
performance.
Formal recognition that damage 
remedies should be chosen to pro-
vide incentives for optimal breach 
as well as for performance is 
somewhat novel in the legal liter-
ature. But the damage rules that 
have in fact evolved, and espe-
cially expectation damages, pro-
vide appropriate incentives for 
both performance and optimal 
breach. Thus, while legal scholars 
and lawyers may argue that 
breach is immoral because it con-
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utilities believed that their next 
generating units would be tradi-
tional fossil-fuel boiler plants. 
Their experience with gas turbines 
in the 1960s and 1970s, regulatory 
moratoriums on the use of gas, and 
high gas prices precluded gas tur-
bines from most generation-
expansion plans.
he crowning blow was the 
Fuel Use Act of 1977, which 
precluded the use of natural gas as 
a fuel for new baseload units. 
These factors combined to push 
utilities away from gas turbines 
until gas prices fell and the Fuel 
Use Act was effectively repealed in 
the mid-1980s. With metallurgical 
enhancements applied to gas-
turbine technologies, especially the 
improvements in the combined-
cycle gas turbines, and lower gas 
prices, natural gas turbines became 
the technology of choice for new 
electric-generating units.
These developments were not 
anticipated in the early 1980s, 
when capital costs for nuclear and 
coal plants ranged from $1,000 to 
$2,000 per kW, capital recovery 
was being deferred, and there were 
frequent generation plant cost 
overruns and escalating fuel costs. 
Under these circumstances the 
avoided costs were projected to be 
5 to 9 cents per kWh, which was 
sufficient to adequately compen-
sate many QFs for their invest-
ments and operating costs. More-
over, with the developments in 
natural gas technologies and prices 
noted above, natural-gas turbines 
became the technology of choice 
because they could be built for 
$600 to $900 per kW with fuel costs 
of 2.5 to 3.0 cents per kWh.
The result was additional entry 
of NUGs that could produce and 
sell to incumbent utilities under 
power purchase agreements 
(PPAs) that contained very favor-
able terms. Moreover, under rate-
of-return regulation, a utility could 
pass through purchased power 
costs directly to its ratepayers 
while their own investments were 
increasingly subject to prudence 
review and management audit. 
The NUGs could take risks and 
plants and/or pay contract prices 
of 5 to 9 cents per kWh.
 
20
 
In retrospect, many states used 
avoided-cost estimates that 
turned out to be much too high. 
Oil-price forecasts in the early 
1980s projected soaring fuel 
prices, with some analysts pre-
dicting crude oil prices of $100 
per bbl ($17 per MMbtu) by 1985, 
and natural gas prices of $9 per 
MMbtu. Some states incorpo-
rated escalation factors into NUG 
contracts based on these high 
fuel costs and inflation rates that 
had been experienced in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Because of 
the provisions in PURPA and the 
manner in which avoided-cost 
mandates were implemented by 
state commissions, some utilities 
were required to sign contracts 
for non-utility-generated power 
even when they did not need 
new capacity. In other instances 
far too much capacity was con-
tracted for.
URPA incentives were origi-
nally expected to add some 
12,000 MW of QF power by 1995, 
but 32,000 MW of QF power had 
been developed by 1991. In Cali-
fornia alone during 1984 and 1985, 
utilities signed contracts for thou-
sands of megawatts of new capac-
ity with prices based on wildly 
extravagant estimates of avoided 
costs. The projections were based 
on forecasts of rising fuel prices, 
with contract terms extending 15 
to 20 years with fixed energy and 
capacity payments for the first 10 
years. Although the expected high 
fuel prices never materialized, the 
utilities were required to pay 
avoided costs based on the fore-
 
In retrospect, 
many states used 
avoided-cost 
estimates that 
turned out to be 
 
much too high.
 
benefit from the expected price 
cost differentials, whereas the utili-
ties could take risks but were 
required to pass the benefits on to 
their ratepayers. NUG agreements 
naturally flourished under these 
conditions. The PPAs often pro-
vided “must-run” status for QFs 
and NUGs to protect their invest-
ments, with little risk for the buyer 
as long as purchased power costs 
could be passed through. How-
ever, these provisions meant that 
the utility could not dispatch units 
in merit order, thereby resulting in 
utilities’ cutting back on generat-
ing units with energy costs under 2 
cents per kWh to operate the QF 
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casts. These circumstances led to 
contracts that were prime candi-
dates for breach and renegotiation. 
Efforts were made in the early 
1990s to renegotiate the excessive 
avoided-cost payments, but since 
the QFs had based their invest-
ments on firm PPAs that had been 
authorized and encouraged under 
the requirements of PURPA, regu-
lators and federal courts often 
defended the original contracts.
 
21
 
 
Thus, QF contracts must be hon-
ored for the life of the contract or 
bought out prior to expiration.
NUG contracts are concen-
trated among only a few utilities, 
with two-thirds of all potentially 
stranded NUG contracts held by 
just 10 utilities. The top two 
account for more than 25 percent 
of the nation’s entire stranded 
NUG contracts.
 
22
 
 As recently as 
1995, NUGs supplied just 7 per-
cent of all electricity to the grid, 
but represented one-third of the 
nation’s potential stranded costs 
($42 billion).
 
23
 
 The average price 
of NUG power was $62 per MWh, 
or more than 70 percent higher 
than the cost of generation by util-
ities. Perhaps more troubling is 
the extremely long time horizon 
of the potential liabilities. If we 
analyze detailed information on 
more than 80 percent of all NUG 
contracts, we find only 29 percent 
of the contract commitments for a 
minimum of 200 GWh a year 
expire before 2010.
Utilities are paying more for 
power than ever before, as NUG 
purchases make up a large per-
centage of overall power pur-
chases. These disparities have 
helped prompt some utilities to 
buy out their NUG contracts, risk 
bankruptcy, or press for regula-
tory reform and stranded-cost 
recovery. This is why the QF and 
NUG contracts are often part of a 
utility’s stranded costs and as 
such represent an impediment to 
retail competition.
 
IV. Renegotiations of
NUG Contracts
 
As has been shown above, to 
date the most common utility and 
NUG relationship featured long-
term PPAs for capacity and energy. 
Such PPAs made project financing 
of single assets feasible and attrac-
tive, especially when a credit-
worthy power purchaser, such as a 
cost-of-service regulated utility, 
was the counterparty to the PPA. 
Once in place, the PPA effectively 
insulated NUGs from competitive 
pressures. With wholesale electric-
ity prices in the $27 to $35 per 
MWh range, it is not surprising 
that utilities with large numbers of 
NUG contracts are moving to 
reduce their exposure.
hy did utilities sign long-
term NUG contracts in the 
first place? Why not simply rely on 
spot-market purchases to meet 
excess demands as needed, or on 
informal agreements for longer-
term arrangements? The answer is 
simple: unlike implicit contracts or 
self-enforcing agreements, formal 
written contracts are legally 
enforceable. The buyers were will-
ing to commit to long-term agree-
ments because they had an obliga-
tion to serve, and their purchased 
power costs could be passed 
through to ratepayers. NUGs were 
willing to make commitments 
because the contracts contained pro-
W
Once in place, the PPA effectively insulated NUGs from competitive pressures.
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visions that would allow them to 
cover costs and make a profit. The 
long-term power purchase agree-
ments, unlike oral promises and at-
will agreements, were backed by the 
power of the state. Legally binding 
written contracts enabled parties to 
cooperate by making their commit-
ments credible.
t the time most NUG contracts 
were signed, the possibility 
of extensive regulatory restructur-
ing and technological advance-
ments were not sufficiently taken 
into account. However, the restruc-
turing of natural gas markets along 
with advances in gas-turbine tech-
nology has revolutionized the gen-
eration business. A new combined-
cycle gas plant can currently be 
built for approximately $400 per 
kW. Capital costs, operations and 
maintenance (O&M) costs, and 
fuel costs can be recovered and 
still provide a profit margin at 
about 3 cents per kWh (assuming 
95 percent capacity utilization). 
This is cheap compared to the 5 to 
9 cents per kWh paid under the 
earlier NUG contracts. At the 
moment, the high NUG costs are 
mostly recovered directly from 
electricity customers under cost-
of-service regulation.
With the rising specter of compe-
tition, utilities are especially con-
cerned with their exposure to 
NUG contracts that contribute to 
making their power among the 
most expensive in the United 
States. Market pressure and a dete-
riorating competitive position is 
forcing renegotiation of NUG con-
tracts. The ability to lower the cost 
of purchased power may be prob-
lematic under many NUG con-
tracts, since they are constrained 
by the terms of their financing 
agreements. With debt/equity 
ratios at 80/20 at best, financial 
institutions have a lot of money at 
risk in PURPA-dependent plants. 
However, reductions in line with 
market rates are a much better 
alternative than bankruptcy, which 
some utilities may be forced to 
declare if these contracts are not 
renegotiated.
ennsylvania Power & Light 
(PP&L) also has moved to buy 
out NUG contracts. In early 1996, 
the company paid $91 million to 
terminate a 100 MW contract from a 
coal gasification plant. PP&L still 
has a substantial exposure to NUG 
contracts that cost the company 
$201.7 million in 1997 for 3,053 
GWh of electric power. The average 
price of that power was $66.06 per 
MWh with a range between $37 per 
MWh and $1,245 per MWh.
Third parties, such as Citizens 
Power, have successfully restruc-
tured some NUG contracts 
through a combination of physical 
and financial reengineering that 
maintained economic value for the 
NUG while generating substantial 
savings for the utility. In a recent 
restructuring of a contract between 
Central Maine Power (CMP) and 
Maine Energy Recovery Corpora-
tion, Citizens structured and 
implemented financing of over $80 
million, and accepted certain risks 
associated with this financing, in 
order to minimize the cost of the 
funds associated with the NUG. 
The flow of power supplied by the 
project was restructured, so that a 
lower level of power at above-
market prices would flow to CMP 
from Citizens. The contract dura-
tion was extended five years, at a 
price consistent with market pro-
jections. Most importantly, the 
power pricing, formerly a single 
price per kWh, was divided into an 
energy component and a capacity 
component to more accurately 
reflect costs under the restructured 
agreement. The sum of these new 
energy and capacity values reflects 
a significant saving (net present 
Electric companies have begun 
seeking solutions to the NUG 
problem. In March 1997, Niagara 
Mohawk Power Company (NiMo) 
and 19 NUGs announced that they 
had reached an agreement to 
restructure or terminate 44 power 
contracts. The present value of 
these 44 power contracts is approx-
imately $9 billion. According to 
NiMo, this agreement covers 90 
percent of NiMo’s above-market 
electricity costs, and it has been 
estimated that it will save NiMo $5 
billion over 15 years. The plan calls 
for the NUGs to receive $3.6 billion 
in cash and equity of 46 million 
shares of NiMo stock.
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value: $24 million) relative to the 
previous contract.
 
24
 
Clearly, these buyouts can gener-
ate gains for all parties, compared 
with the alternative of litigation or 
bankruptcy of the utility and/or 
NUG. Customers get part of the 
savings through lower prices as 
well. Hence, this kind of breach, 
followed by renegotiation, repre-
sents an efficient response to the 
changing environment facing 
electric utilities, and should not be 
discouraged by regulators or 
courts. Requiring utilities to 
honor the original NUG contracts 
represents specific performance, 
an inferior remedy to renegotia-
tions that essentially provide 
breach victims with reliance or 
expectation damages.
hen examining breaches, 
FERC and the courts 
should consider the relationship 
between the damage rule (and the 
compensation provided by renego-
tiations) and the recovery of 
stranded costs. For utilities, reli-
ance damages exactly equal expec-
tation damages under rate-of-
return regulation; hence, utilities 
may be indifferent about which 
standard is used. For NUGs, expec-
tation damages will generally 
exceed reliance damages by the 
expected net present value of their 
return on investment that is in 
excess of their cost of capital. This 
is generally presumed to be posi-
tive since the prices they received 
under PPAs were based on over-
stated estimates of avoided costs.
The ability to pass through the 
cost of purchased power in 
tariff rates under rate of return 
regulation made the NUG con-
tracts reasonably acceptable to the 
utilities. But the advent of compe-
tition into wholesale and some 
retail electricity markets has made 
most of these contracts economi-
cally nonviable, since customers 
can buy power at market prices, 
leaving utilities saddled with the 
cost of NUG power. As the NUG 
contracts are renegotiated and 
possibly litigated the question 
arises as to what damage theory or 
 
V. Conclusion
 
Clearly, as market governance 
replaces lighter forms of regula-
tory oversight, renegotiations and 
litigation over contractual terms 
will continue. The contracts utili-
ties negotiated with NUGs when 
they were operating under rate-of-
return regulation—with the expec-
tation that purchased power costs 
would be passed through to their 
ratepayers—are prime examples. 
These contracts are often no longer 
viable as utilities face increasing 
pressure to lower costs to become 
competitive. One way to lower 
costs is to renegotiate NUG con-
tracts, which we have argued can 
generate net gains.
More generally, private institu-
tions and individuals operating 
within organizations and markets 
should be regarded as the first line 
of defense when dealing with con-
tract breach. For contracts that are 
freely entered into, an expectation 
damages rule tends to promote 
optimal contract performance and 
optimal breach. Therefore, an 
expectation damages rule is appro-
priate when renegotiating or liti-
gating such contracts. On the other 
hand, a reliance damages rule may 
be used as a lower bound when 
renegotiating or litigating con-
tracts that were required or at least 
strongly influenced by more intru-
sive regulatory rules. These rules 
should help establish an institu-
tional environment consistent with 
true structural reform.
ost importantly, contract 
renegotiations should be 
allowed as an acceptable alterna-
tive to continued regulatory over-
rule(s) should be applied. A reli-
ance damages rule would com-
pensate the NUGs for their sunk 
costs and would be equivalent to a 
merger or acquisition by the utility 
at historical costs. This would put 
NUG contracts on the same footing 
as the utilities’ own investments 
under a cost-of-service regime. An 
expectation damages rule would 
compensate the NUGs for past 
investments in accord with their 
original expectations. A reliance 
damages rule may be a reasonable 
lower bound for negotiated or liti-
gated settlements of NUG contracts 
with an expectation damages rule 
as the upper bound.
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sight. Decisions about the restruc-
turing of NUG contracts should be 
economically rather than politi-
cally motivated. Indeed, it was 
political motivation that gave birth 
to NUG contracts in the first place, 
and continued political interven-
tion will only impede the progress 
of the electricity industry toward 
regulatory restructuring. 
 
j
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